REBUILDING
1. The
demands on both the public sector and the donor community have been enormous
since the tsunami struck
2. As we move into the reconstruction
phase however, a phase necessarily more complex and fraught with potential
pitfalls, it has become clear that the country needs to make better use of the
wealth of knowledge, skills, energy and goodwill that exists beyond Colombo.
This means adopting practices that significantly increase accountability at the
sub-national levels. It means involving the affected populations more directly
in the shaping of the recovery effort. And it means taking more fully into
account the context in which the recovery is being carried out.
3. Thus, at the risk of over-simplifying
the many recommendations that have emerged from the district consultations, the
following is a list of core recommendations that we believe need to be
considered as the recovery effort moves forward:
Ø
Key policies that can only, in
practice, be elaborated at the national level need to be defined and
communicated to all concerned. These include in particular those related to
land, housing and livelihood support. It is important that these policies be
defined only broadly and in terms of principles, leaving sufficient flexibility
to each district to adapt them to local needs and preferences.
Ø
The responsibilities of each level
of government should be clearly defined with regards to each of the above
policies, giving the maximum amount of authority possible to the lower levels
of government in order to increase transparency and accountability. The
management of human resources within the public sector, in terms of incentives
and controls, should reflect these levels of authority.
Ø
Methods of consultation with the
affected populations, leaving some flexibility as to the precise way this is
done locally, should be promoted at the highest levels of government, with a
means of follow-up defined to ensure that this is being done. Care needs to be
taken to ensure that all parts of the population are reached by these methods,
including women, the disabled and the elderly.
Ø
More attention should be paid to
setting up appropriate coordination mechanisms at all levels (national,
provincial, district and division) to ensure that an inclusive approach is
taken with regards to the many actors in the recovery effort. For this
coordination to be effective, adequate data needs to be compiled and made
available, including data that is gender disaggregated.
Ø
These coordination bodies should
pay particular attention to how the needs of the tsunami-affected population
are being addressed in the different districts, versus the needs of
conflict-affected families and those who are suffering simply from endemic
poverty. The principles of equity and avoidance of increased tensions should
guide how these needs are addressed.
Ø
The recommendations in this
summary and in the district reports need to be articulated further before they
can be applied in practice. We suggest this can best be done via a series of
multi-stakeholder sectoral workshops in each of the districts and at national
level, aimed at developing detailed action plans that allocate
responsibilities, identify resource needs (including capacity ones) and set
clear timelines.
4. A preliminary joint assessment of
post-tsunami damage and of recovery needs was carried out in January by the
Asian Development Bank, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency and the World Bank, with contributions from
various UN agencies, bilateral donors, members of civil society and the
Government. It was intended that this assessment serve as a technical support
to the preparation of the national recovery plan for the tsunami disaster zone.
The drafting of the assessment report involved numerous consultations with all
major stakeholders in the recovery plan, including agencies and representatives
of the government, the LTTE, civil society organizations and, of course, the
disaster victims themselves.
5. However,
during this preliminary assessment, it was recognised that the severe time
constraints resulting from the G7 request to produce, for the end of January, a
rapid report on the economic impact and estimates of the cost of recovery would
not allow for as full a process of consultation as would be necessary to ensure
a broad sense of ownership and commitment with regards to the eventual recovery
effort.
6. It was therefore agreed that a second
phase would be required, in which government, civil society, local stakeholders
and donors would work closely together so that a wider range of stakeholders
could be consulted, a variety of issues connected to implementation mechanisms
could be examined and, in consequence, more emphasis could be placed not so
much on what
needed to be done as on how.
It was also agreed that this phase of the assessment would strive to explore
practically how the implementation of the recovery plan could reasonably
incorporate the “Guiding Principles of the Recovery and Reconstruction
Strategy” already endorsed by the major stakeholders.
7. To carry out this mandate, nine field
teams were formed, composed of multi-sector experts proposed by the Government
(Colombo and district based), civil society and donor organizations. In the
case of the teams focusing on the North and East, the LTTE was invited to also
designate resource persons, while the Eastern district teams included a
representative of the local Muslim community. Each field team was thus composed
of five to nine individuals and was assigned one to three districts, depending
on geographical contiguity and the extent of damage to be addressed. In
addition, a “support/advisory team” was formed of stakeholder representatives
and crosscutting experts to provide advice to the field teams and input into
the drafting of the final reports.
8. Each team travelled to their respective
districts for a period of four to seven days and met with a wide range of local
stakeholders to gather their views on the current state of the recovery
implementation and on how the implementation could best be moved forward.
Several thousand individuals were consulted in the districts, from all walks of
life.
9. Each team then drafted an initial
report and, in most cases, either returned to the district to fill in gaps in
information from the previous visit or carried out supplementary telephone
interviews for the same purpose. This Executive Summary presents an overview of
the team findings and their key recommendations. In annex are the reports of
each of the respective teams, where the reader can find more details as to
specific conditions and ways forward in each district.
10. The tsunami that struck Sri Lanka on the
morning of December 26, 2004, killed over 31,000 people, destroyed over 99,000
homes, damaged natural ecosystems and left behind widespread destruction.
Vulnerable groups, such as poor fishermen living close to the shore, suffered
the brunt of the negative impacts. Apart from striking already comparatively
poor coastal communities, the tsunami compounded previously existing
vulnerabilities resulting from civil conflict by making the North East the
hardest hit region. The percentage of the coastal population affected ranged
from an estimated 35% in Kilinochchi to 80% in Mullaitivu and 78% in Ampara
coastal district divisions, compared to the southern districts of Galle,
Matara, and Hambantota, where less than 20 percent of the coastal population
was affected, albeit with scattered pockets of severe damage.
11. In the months following the disaster,
much has been accomplished. The general consensus is that emergency relief was
singularly successful in meeting the immediate needs of the affected people.
The unprecedented outpouring of private and institutional generosity meant that
families were provided with a place to stay, food was distributed, medical
assistance was made available, orphaned children were taken into care. Basic
public services such as education, electricity and security were soon restored
to close to pre-tsunami levels.
12. As a result, the epidemics and deaths
that many feared following the disaster never happened. This rapid
stabilization of a traumatized population has allowed attention to thus quickly
be turned towards the, in many ways, more difficult and complex challenge of
assisting the affected areas to return to normalcy and the affected families to
begin to rebuild their lives.
13. At the time of writing, work on refining
the estimates of how much post-tsunami reconstruction will cost are continuing.
Significant variances remain in a number of sectors regarding cost estimates
prepared by the Government and those drawn up by the multilateral donors. This
is in part due to continued uncertainty with respect to the real degree of
damage, notably in sectors such as housing. Nevertheless, it appears that the
total cost of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure, as well as
restoring livelihoods to those who lost them, will be in the range of US $2
billion. The greatest costs are in the housing sector and transport, with large
amounts also identified for livelihoods (including fisheries and tourism),
water/sanitation and power. The annexed district reports explain the needs in
more detail.
14. Clearly a reconstruction effort of this
scale and complexity is not solely a technical challenge, but needs to
carefully take into account the context in which it will be implemented. Who
will be responsible for the different aspects of the recovery? How will the
efforts be coordinated? What will be the impact of the local socio-political
dynamic on the recovery work and vice versa? Are there likely to be winners and
losers? How will the most vulnerable be provided for and what opportunities will
they have to contribute to the recovery effort? Will the recovery activities be
sustainable environmentally, economically and politically? Do the key actors
have the capacity to play an effective part?
15. These are all questions that have a
direct bearing on the effectiveness of the recovery plan and on whether the
recovery will contribute to the long-term development of the country or whether
it will represent a missed opportunity. The main contextual issues identified
by the teams are the following:
16. Socio-political tensions. All the district reports emphasise the
growing frustration, anger and impatience among local stakeholders. These
emotions appear to cut across all ethnic groups, social classes and
professional groups and are, rightly or wrongly, largely focused on the central
government. The source of these tensions is the perception that the affected
populations are not being provided with sufficient nor clear information as to
where the recovery effort is going, nor do they feel that they are being
consulted as to the shape the recovery will take. The escalating alienation is
particularly linked to local confusion over land and housing, as well as to
livelihood support. Finally, and far from least among the sources of tension,
is the looming disparity between the treatment of post-tsunami victims versus
post-conflict ones, those who have suffered from previous disasters (such as
floods) and those suffering from chronic poverty. This is in addition to the
perceived disparity between the different districts and ethnic communities who
were victims of the tsunami. As the weeks have passed since December 26, it has
become ever clearer that both the public authorities and donors will need to
more clearly articulate and apply principles of equity with regards to the
support being offered to these categories of people.
17. Governance. There are a number of concerns linked to
governance and the lack of application of the provisions of the 13th
Amendment that have emerged from the district consultations. One is that the
sub-national levels of government are not sufficiently informed, especially
through official channels, of what government policy is (and the reasons for
the policy) and feel that the information that arrives at their level is too often
contradictory. Faced with this lack of communication, or indeed conflicting
information, the result has often been a paralysis in decision-making,
especially when local authorities are not clear as to what decision-making
powers they have been granted. In addition, the policy-making authority of
certain coordination bodies, such as TAFREN, versus the policy-making authority
of the various line ministries, is a source of confusion in many in the
districts. Finally, despite a desire to take on more responsibility at the
district and divisional levels for directing the recovery effort, there are
clear gaps or weaknesses in the capacity of these local structures to do so
effectively, notably in the areas of planning and monitoring, human resource
management, financial management, inclusive urban development and community
consultation/mobilization. They will thus need urgent and substantive support
if they are to effectively carry out such responsibilities. Finally, in line
with the agreed guiding principles, safeguards against corruption will need to
be assured at all levels of the recovery effort, notably by implementing
regular audits of financial flows and by reinforcing the accountability of all
those responsible for recovery activities.
18. Gender.
The particular needs of women appear to have been largely neglected in
the disaster response to date, due to the infrequency of direct consultations
with them. These encompass issues such as sanitation, privacy and personal
security. As a result, reports of various types of abuse have been an all too
frequent feature of the recovery to date. In addition, there has been a general
failure to perceive of women not only as victims of the disaster, but also as
key actors in shaping the recovery. This would involve systematically including
them in consultations regarding such issues as housing design, livelihood
support programs, new locations for resettlement projects, access to land, the
planning of social infrastructure, public transportation, etc. A particular feature
of the post-tsunami environment is the significant number of men that have been
forced into the role of prime care-givers in the family, due to the death of
their spouse, and who thus could benefit from assistance and advice in taking
on this new role. It was frequently noted in the district reports that the
collection of gender-disaggregated data is an essential starting point for the
formulation of effective, gender-sensitive approaches.
19. Environment / risk reduction. Environmental concerns following the tsunami
are many and range from the environmental destruction wreaked by the tsunami
itself, to disaster mitigation efforts that need to be carried out in order to
minimize the impact of future natural disasters, to the impact of situating new
communities and infrastructure in new locations, not to mention the disposal of
debris and the procurement of the vast quantity of construction materials
required for the reconstruction phase. While much useful data appears to be
available (ex: the earlier coastal conservation study), little of it appears to
have been used in devising new policies since the tsunami, which often appear
to the local populations to be overly simplistic (ex: a 100 m or 200 m buffer
zone) or subject to baffling exceptions when it comes to the application of
such policies. The result has been either, in some cases, paralysis while local
people wait for clarification of what these new policies actually are, or, in
other cases, de facto rejection as individuals proceed with their own rebuilding.
The lack of local consultation appears to be a major factor in creating this
situation.
20. Land.
The issue of land is connected, in one way or another, with most of the
frustrations mentioned earlier and is perceived by many to be an issue of fundamental
human rights. Given the disruption resulting from the 100/200 m buffer zone,
where can families rebuild their homes? Will women have equal access to land
and land titles? What will be the impact on the social fabric of communities
who have lived together for generations? What will be the impact on their
livelihoods? What are the socio-political consequences of obliging ethnic
groups or castes to live together or in close proximity, when those groups have
traditionally not mixed? What happens when local geographic realities (ex:
lagoons) hugely complicate relocation plans? The consultations confirm that
these are all questions to which there are unlikely to be easy answers. But the
consultations also confirm that, because of their inherent sensitivity, these
questions need to be resolved with the input of those directly concerned, so
that despite eventual outcomes that are unlikely to be wholly satisfactory for
all stakeholders, there will at least be a sense of ownership of the result
which will help avoid destabilization in the long-term.
21. Human rights. In the rush to respond to immediate relief
needs and then the confusion over how best to respond to the longer-term
rebuilding needs, little attention appears to have been devoted to the issue of
how basic human rights impact on the planning and implementation of the
reconstruction. These range from the right to be consulted about all issues
affecting them, including any eventual relocation, to the right to express
one’s grievances to the appropriate authorities when one feels that one is not
being justly treated. The right to security and the right to equal treatment
are other examples of rights that, at best, have been unevenly applied.
Included in this latter category are the rights of those who are especially
vulnerable, such as women, children, the disabled and the elderly, to have
appropriate access to the programs and services that are being offered. These
deficiencies point to a need to ensure that local officials are sufficiently
aware of the human rights implications of the programs or services they are
administering, in order to ensure their even-handedness and effectiveness.
22. Housing.
Clearly, housing is intimately tied to the issue of land. Urgent
efforts, integrating local perspectives, need to be invested in clarifying how
the buffer zone rule will, in practice, be applied, including what this means
regarding the options available to those who are resettling. One aspect of this
is whether it is advisable for partially damaged but still habitable houses
within the buffer zone (a large majority according to some estimates) to be
razed and their owners forcibly relocated or whether the policy needs to be
reviewed for social and economic reasons. There also needs to be clarification
as to the mechanisms to be used to finance the construction of the new houses
(or the repairs of the former ones). The district reports contain a number of
suggestions as to how this can be done. Consultation with all categories of
beneficiaries on both the design and location of the new houses is extremely
important, as is the integration of new social infrastructure (schools, medical
facilities) with the new communities.
23. Education.
In some districts, there is confusion over the treatment of national
versus provincial schools. The urgency of getting children who are now coping
with temporary and often inadequate educational facilities into adequately
equipped ones is growing. As with other types of needs, it will be important to
ensure that all children, including girls and the disabled, have sufficient
access to the new facilities. Available land is also a factor here, especially
as most donors in this sector originally offered to reconstruct schools without
considering the cost of installing them in new locations where electricity and
water connections would be needed, as well as transportation access. Teams have
also reported potential tensions between tsunami-affected communities who will
receive a well-equipped school and nearby communities who function with poorly
equipped facilities. The Ministry of Education is considering this disparity
and how best to address it.
24. Health.
The reconstruction issues in this sector are much the same as those in
education: delegation of authority for rebuilding down to the appropriate
levels, urgency of constructing or expanding existing facilities,
identification of the required land and integration with the target
communities, as well as the need for sensitivity in the support being offered to
tsunami-affected communities versus those affected by conflict or simply by
endemic poverty. To these points, one can add the heightened risk of HIV/AIDS
infections associated with social and economic dislocations and therefore the
need to plan awareness-raising activities for tsunami-affected communities, the
need to ensure that reproductive health issues are adequately addressed in the
recovery phase, the need to provide adequate rehabilitation facilities for the
disabled, the need to revise health facility requirements in the light of
current needs, as well as the need to set up a psychosocial counselling service
that is accessible, respectful of cultural norms and operational in the
shortest possible time.
25. Livelihoods. Along with housing, this sector has emerged
as one of the most critical for a viable recovery and one of the most complex.
District reports indicate that there is some danger in focusing too much on
just a few critical sectors such as fishing and tourism, without considering
the need to also regenerate the many secondary occupations that support these
sectors. These secondary occupations are especially critical in that they often
represent key areas of opportunity for women. Several have noted the need to
situate the aid that is given within a wider strategic vision (ex: fishing
methods versus the sustainable exploitation of marine resources) in order to
ensure that the result is both economically and environmentally viable. There
also seems to be some problems with the delivery mechanisms of some programs
that are not inappropriate in themselves, such as low interest loans to
entrepreneurs. The difficulty that has emerged is the lack of incentives for
the delivery institutions to collaborate actively, beyond a very limited scale,
given the costs that they are being asked to incur. Finally, as part of the
general complaint that national policies are unclear in their scope and
inequitable in their application, there is a need to clarify who is eligible
for cash transfers or loans and what are the parameters of these programs. As
was highlighted already, these programs also need to be carefully thought out
and designed to ensure equitable access for all affected members of the
population, including women and the disabled.
26. Social protection. As was noted in the previous section,
vulnerable groups are in special need of attention to ensure that their basic
rights are protected. These include children, the disabled and the elderly, as
well as ethnic minorities in any area. According to the district teams, these
needs are particularly acute in the temporary camps, where security, sanitation
and access to counselling are priority concerns. Teams have thus highlighted
the need to reinforce existing social welfare services to allow them to deal
with the sudden increase in clients to serve.
27. Transport.
Roads (and, in some areas, rail transport) are seen as key to an
effective recovery, a fact reflected in the size of the budgets allocated to
this sector. Although the transport sector was relatively little affected by
the tsunami as such, the needs emerging in the post-tsunami period have
highlighted the neglect and general lack of development that the transport
network has suffered for many years. Although, because of its size and the number
of levels of public authorities who are involved, it will be a complex sector
to manage, transport appears to have been the source of few controversies at
the local level for the moment. Nevertheless, how the new transport
infrastructure will impact on the lives of key categories of the population,
such as women, the disabled and children, is a question that needs to be asked
in the course of planning and implementing transport recovery activities. One
issue already appearing on the horizon is whether the relevant departments will
be accorded the resources required in the future to adequately maintain the
roads that will be constructed.
28. Power.
This sector is similar to transport in that the need is generally agreed
by all parties and the level of need is more a result of years of neglect and
non-development than of the tsunami itself. Nevertheless, the post-disaster
period is seen as an opportune moment to overcome this neglect. However, even
more so than in transport, there is a need to balance the power requirements of
those families who were affected by the tsunami and those who were not,
including conflict-affected victims. In addition, the need to have connections
authorized by the appropriate authorities, in a context where building permits
and land entitlements are still subjects of controversy, means that substantial
delays are likely until sufficient policy clarification is provided.
29. Water and sanitation. Obviously, water and sanitation are closely
connected with the issues that impact on housing and the environment. One of
the more urgent facets of this sector is improving the conditions in the camps
and locations where there will be transitional shelters. For the medium and
longer-term reconstruction needs, the NWSDB appears to have a reasonable base
from which to respond to these needs, although all teams concur that they will
require more staff and equipment. Given the importance of water and sanitation
to habitations and businesses, it will be key that these services are closely
integrated with the planning of any resettlement and are a part of the same
inclusive consultative processes being recommended in other sectors.
30. Coastal protection. The key issues here are closely linked to
those summarized in the earlier section on the environment. The consensus from
the district visits is that there is a need to better use previous studies in
this field, to consult local populations, including women, as to their
preferences and to give priority to natural protection methods such as mangroves
and reefs rather than expensive man-made barriers. In this sector, a sense of
local ownership and responsibility, beginning with an awareness of the options,
is particularly important if the protection methods are to be sustainable.
Finally, several teams noted the jurisdictional complexity of this sector.
Multiple government departments, as well as the security forces and myriad
community groups all have a stake in the coastal protection methods adopted.
Coordination, consultation and devolution are thus vital to success in this
sector.
31. Loss compensation. Compensation for human losses, i.e. deaths,
appears to have been reasonably well carried out, although there are concerns
in some localities that not all eligible families have benefited, due to lack
of documentation or information. In the case of material losses to households
or businesses, the teams have reported many unmet needs, given that insurance
levels were often inadequate and documentation of losses poor. Some of these
losses will nevertheless be compensated for by the provision of housing or
through livelihood support. However, for both very poor families and the larger
businesses, it appears that significant gaps will remain in assisting a return
to normality, which will require further thinking among the concerned
stakeholders.
32. Governance capacity. The problems and the opportunities in this
sector were highlighted previously. To adequately exploit these opportunities,
there is a need to clearly communicate to all concerned the relevant broad
national policies, including operational procedures, with regards to the
recovery, as well as to define the nature and level of responsibility of the
various public authorities. The aim should be to devolve decision-making
responsibility to levels as close to the affected people as possible, including
the Pradeshya Sabhas, with the intention of such devolution increasing both
transparency and official accountability[1]. Because of the number of
actors involved in the recovery, the degree of coordination needs to be
improved, a task that can only be done if better information management systems
at all levels are put in place and maintained. Naturally, to manage these
increased responsibilities, a careful program of capacity building support will
need to be included as an integral part of the recovery effort, tailored to the
needs of each area but probably including the strengthening of financial and
human resource management, planning skills, monitoring approaches and community
consultation/mobilization techniques.
33. The sheer size of the reconstruction
effort will put enormous demands on the country’s capacity to implement it, in
terms of adequate supplies of materials, skilled labour and managerial
expertise, not to mention the processing of imports and the monitoring of
project activities. Thus, beyond the elaboration of policies and national
standards, there is an urgent need for each sector to carry out detailed
logistical planning to ensure that the capacity will be there to reach the identified
objectives, not only within that particular sector but also with respect to
other sectors that will also be making their demands on Sri Lanka’s delivery
capacity.
34. The following is a brief summary of the
core recommendations emphasised in each of the district reports. For a fuller
view of the context and specific recommendations, the reader is invited to
consult the district reports that are attached to this Executive Summary.
35. Jaffna.
Ø Local solutions should be found to local problems, using local human resources, including the issue of shoreline setbacks.
Ø A District Planning Unit under the GA, composed of representatives of all major stakeholders, should be established to guide post-tsunami planning and implementation.
Ø A balance needs to be struck between support to conflict-affected and tsunami-affected families.
Ø Consultation and participation should be incorporated in the approaches used in the various sectors.
Ø Local financial institutions should redirect savings back to the community for development purposes.
36. Kilinochchi/Mullaitivu.
Ø
The establishment of a joint
mechanism is essential for more effective implementation of the recovery.
Ø
Existing administrative structures
should be used to direct the recovery work, rather than setting up new ones.
Ø
Implementation modalities should
be flexible, as long as there is transparency and national standards are
adhered to.
Ø
An effective information and
communication system is essential for involving communities in the recovery
effort and for promoting accountability.
Ø
Building trust in the course of
implementing the tsunami recovery can open opportunities for restarting the
peace process.
37. Trincomalee.
Ø
Local authorities need to be
empowered to take maximum responsibility for the recovery work, despite the
lack of local elected bodies.
Ø
Cooperation and coordination among
all aid actors, with an effective coordination mechanism, is essential for an
effective recovery effort; the UN could play a more important role in this
sense.
Ø
Equitable treatment between
conflict-affected and tsunami-affected people is essential to avoid frustration
and anger.
Ø
Information management needs to be
strengthened so that key actors know what the others are doing.
38. Batticaloa.
Ø
Beneficiary communities, for
example via Village Rehabilitation Committees, need to systematically consulted
about recovery planning and implementation; it is important that these VRCs be
inclusive of all sections of the community.
Ø
More financial and administrative
autonomy should be given to district administrators within a national
framework; their capacity to take on these responsibilities should be
reinforced at the same time.
Ø
The GA’s office should take charge
of district coordination, with representation from TAFREN.
Ø
Public information techniques such
as a newsletter and public hearings should be further explored.
Ø
Cross cutting issues such as
gender, environment and disability should be integrated in all recovery
activities.
39. Ampara.
Ø
An information transmission system
should be set up to allow both more effective communication of government
policies to the local population and feedback to the Government from the
people.
Ø
Affected people should have the
opportunity to be consulted and to participate in recovery implementation; this
may require providing them with training in certain skills.
Ø
Recovery activities need an
effective monitoring mechanism; this could be done through a district committee
composed of representatives of all major stakeholders.
Ø
Existing management structures
should be used to manage recovery activities, to save time.
Ø
Land acquisition for relocated
houses and infrastructure needs to be made a priority.
40. Hambantota.
Ø
“Cash for work” programs should be
expanded beyond immediate needs; other livelihood support should include skills
training and be better coordinated.
Ø
Provision of fishing boats needs
to be more transparent and better coordinated to ensure the industry remains
viable.
Ø
Criteria for the allocation of
houses need to be urgently clarified; prospective beneficiaries should be
consulted on the design and location of their houses.
Ø
Water and sanitation projects need
to be expanded to include neighbouring communities and should beneficiaries of
new housing should be consulted regarding water and sanitation provision.
Ø
Camp security and hygiene needs to
be reinforced.
Ø
Donors should work closely with
“Helping Hambantota” and share information on activities among themselves and
with the Government.
41. Matara.
Ø
The Government needs to clarify
policy and improve communications with the district; transparency at the local
level should be improved.
Ø
Beneficiaries need to be more
involved in the housing construction process, from planning to implementation;
innovative examples of participative housing provision elsewhere in Sri Lanka
need to be assessed for lessons learned.
Ø
Innovative options to public
sector provision of services, such as cash grants, should be explored.
Ø
Psychosocial counselling needs to
be expanded and made more effective.
Ø
Gender disaggregated data needs to
be collected and analysed.
Ø
A more nuanced approach to
shoreline setbacks should be considered; natural coastal protection measures
are preferred.
42. Galle.
Ø
A systematic coordination
mechanism at district level needs to be established.
Ø
An effective information strategy
that aims to both inform the population and channel feedback to the Government
should be set up.
Ø
Island-wide criteria for
identifying beneficiaries of post-tsunami support programs would ensure proper
targeting, minimise political influence and improve transparency.
Ø
Communities should be involved in
selecting beneficiaries and in choosing and implementing environmental
protection measures.
Ø
Ministries and departments should
receive appropriate budget allocations immediately to allow them to fulfil
their increased responsibilities; they should also explore redeploying staff
according to the post-tsunami needs.
43. Kalutara/Colombo/Gampaha.
Ø
Community consultation and
participation is an essential part of an effective recovery effort; this will
require capacity building for local authorities and NGOs.
Ø
An implementation mechanism
involving a “cascade” of coordinating bodies from the national to the district
to the divisional to the community level should be put in place, using the
Guiding Principles as a point of reference.
Ø
Innovation should be encouraged to
use alternative technologies and look beyond stereotypes, in order to use
approaches that are more inclusive and more environmentally friendly.
Ø
Capacity building, adapted to the
locality and the organisation, is a key element in making subsidiarity work; it
should be budgeted for.
[1] The individual district reports give more details on this type of devolution of responsibilities.