Trincomalee District
Affected Divisional Secretary Divisions
(1) Kuchchaveli
(2) Town and Gravets
(3) Kinniya
(4) Seruwila
(5) Muttur
(6) Echchilampattai
Affected People
Damages to Different Sectors
Information on damages to different socio-economic sectors
is not available.
Actions Taken
Confronted Problems and Issues
Challenges Ahead
Post Tsunami Recovery Process
District Experience and Challenges Ahead
Trincomalee District
Affected
Divisional Secretary Divisions
(1)
Kuchchaveli
(2)
Town and Gravets
(3)
Kinniya
(4)
Seruwila
(5)
Muttur
(6)
Echchilampattai
Affected
People
·
Total number of persons
displaced: 72,986
·
Number of affected families
: 30,574
·
Total number of affected
persons: 126,679
·
Total number of deaths and
missing: 967
Damages
to Different Sectors
Information
on damages to different socio-economic sectors is not available.
Actions
Taken
·
A District Task Force was
formed to coordinate the relief and reconstruction activities with the
participation of civil societies, development agencies, political parties,
business community, LTTE and other government institutions.
·
More than 100,000 persons
have already returned to their homes or are staying with relatives and friends.
The others are in temporary shelters such as tents, schools and other
buildings.
·
Nearly 3,320 families
(13,778 persons) were temporary resided in 33 welfare camps.
·
Pledges were given for
13,126 transitional shelters and 8549 permanent houses by local and foreign
donor agencies.
·
Construction of 2,677
transitional housing units have been completed and 3,380 are under
construction.
·
A Council for rebuilding
district of Trincomalee was formed.
·
Transitional Accommodation
Project (TAP) and Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit, operating under TAFREN
have established their offices in the district of Trincomalee to coordinate and
monitor housing construction activities.
Confronted
Problems and Issues
·
Non-familiarity of the many
involving organizations regarding the problems of conflict affected communities
and ethnic and community tensions in the area.
·
Inadequate capacity of some
Local Government Authorities.
·
Slow decision making and
slow re-construction process resulted from centralized disaster management
system.
·
Lack of regular forum
between the Government machinery and the LTTE in the coordination of relief and
reconstruction activities.
·
Unequal distribution of
tsunami relief and irregularities in reconstruction activities due to the
existing ethnic and political discord.
Challenges
Ahead
·
A strong coordination and
communication system should be in place to deal with the large number of NGOs
and other actors as well as influx of resources for relief and reconstruction
activities.
·
Strengthening Central and
Local Government administrative systems and capacity thus enabling to improve
district reconstruction plans.
·
Have a more decentralized
decision making system to respond to the real needs of the people effectively
within a short period of time.
·
Improving the transparency
of central government policies and ensuring effective communication from top to
bottom.
·
Avoiding resumption of armed
hostilities and having a close dialogue with the LTTE in carrying out the
tsunami reconstruction activities in un-cleared areas.
·
Strengthening community
participation in the implementation of reconstruction plans.
EXPERIENCE AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
Trincomalee District
Trincomalee District has 141.6
km of coastline. The Tsunami affected 6 of the 11 Divisional
Secretariat (DS) areas. The Immediate
impact resulted in 30,547 families being internally displaced (126,679
individuals, 24% of the district population), but with a comparatively low
number of deaths, 967.
Of initial concern was the damage
to housing. 4873 houses were fully
damaged and 3945 houses were partially damaged.
NGOs, businesses, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, private
individuals, UN agencies and other concerned parties have pledged 13,126
transitional shelters and 8,549
permanent houses. In spite of
numerous obstacles, at latest report 3,380 transitional shelter units
were under construction and now, almost four months after the tsunami 2,677
transitional housing units have been completed (16 April 2005, TAP office,
Katchcheri, Trincomalee).
As of the end of March, there
were still 33 IDP camps, with 3,321 families (13,778 persons) staying in 15
schools and 18 other buildings (29 March, Additional Government Agent’s Office,
Katchcheri, Trincomalee). Of those
initially displaced, more than 100,000 have been able to return to their homes
or are staying with friends and relatives.
The remaining continue to live in temporary shelters including tents,
schools, other government buildings, temples, etc.
Extensive damage also occurred
to, among others, the following sectors: fishing and agriculture; health; water
supply and sanitation; other utilities; tourism; education; physical
infrastructure (182 km of road, damage to Trincomalee port, bridges, bus and
train systems, etc.); government and public facilities.
By 31st December 2004,
the Government Agent(GA) in collaboration with civil society and other key
development actors, elected political representatives, representatives from
political parties, police, military and other GOSL departments, the LTTE and
representatives from the business community created the District Task Force to
coordinate Tsunami response and relief activities. Six sub committees were formed: education; shelter management; camp
management; search and rescue; date collection; health, sanitation and public
utilities.
The District Task Force Committee
provided an opportunity to bring everyone together at the same table and created
a forum for dialogue among the different actors, particularly among the
Government and LTTE. However, the Task
Force was constrained by the lack of clear authority from the GOSL, as a result
it was forced to operate by consensus, and many actors continued to focus on
their own specific interests.
The Task Force was replaced in
mid February (19th Feb) by a new Council for Rebuilding Trincomalee
District, chaired from Colombo. Other
than an initial fact finding and orientation meeting, the new Council has been
inoperative and there continues to be a lack of clear direction from Colombo on
reconstruction policies for Trincomalee.
The Transitional Accommodation Project (TAP) and Tsunami Housing
Reconstruction Unit (THRU), both operating under the (TAFREN) have established
offices in Trincomalee and are monitoring and coordination housing
reconstruction.
Following the tsunami a large
number of NGOs and other concerned parties came to Trincomalee district to
assist in the disaster response. There
were positive and negative consequences of this influx of assistance. The increased number of actors improved the
local response capacity and provided vital assistance in the immediate
aftermath of the disaster. However, the
large influx also created a difficult coordination and logistics environment,
with many organizations and individuals acting without clear communication or
coordination with the government or other actors, particularly in the initial
response period. The government
structures in place after the tsunami were not sufficient to monitor and
coordinator ongoing activities.
Additionally, many organizations
and individuals arriving in Trincomalee did not have previous experience in
Trincomalee or the conflict affected North East of Sri Lanka. These organizations were unfamiliar with the
history of the conflict or aware of the ethnic and community tensions. Lack of familiarity with the local situation
led to inappropriate construction materials being used, lack of culture and
gender sensitivity in Food and Non Food Relief Item distribution, ignoring
conflict affected IDPs, etc.
The influx of organizations and
other actors was accompanied by a proportional inflow of resources, both
financial and human. Countless hours and
materials were donated irrespective of race, gender or religion, acting as
possible source of reconciliation between the different communities involved in
the Sri Lanka conflict.
However, after the initial
response, because of the continuing inflow of high levels of resources, many of
which are earmarked only for tsunami response, competition has increased among
NGOs and other actors. Imbalances have
been perceived among communities receiving assistance and local market
distortions are occurring as organizations feel compelled to use their
resources. There is also a perception
that organizations are spending disproportionate levels on overhead instead of
assisting the affected people. The
abundance of resources has also increased opportunities for graft and
corruption among officials. There is
also concern about ulterior or secondary motives of actors involved in the
reconstruction process, whether political, religious, cultural, economic, etc.
The sheer magnitude of the
disaster and the number of actors involved in response and reconstruction has
highlighted weak existing government structures, particularly in regards to
data collection, reporting and monitoring.
The wide range of organizations involved in response and reconstruction
and the wide variety of activities undertaken including assessments, surveys
and other data collection, has proven difficult for the government to manage. Constraints
on the government including lack of personnel trained in data collection, lack
of resources, lack of communication and coordination among different government
agencies leading to duplication, lack of standardization in date collection
efforts, etc., has severely hampered the effectiveness and accuracy of data
collection and monitoring of reconstruction activities, and limited the ability
of the government to verify data collected by the government or by outside
organizations. There are often wide
discrepancies among date collected by independent organizations and the
government, and even among different government agencies.
A serious concern continues to be
the lack of consistent coordination among organizations working in
Trincomalee. Since the cessation of the
District Task Force, there have been no District wide coordination efforts
involving all actors. Many agencies
continue to participate in sector wise coordination meetings as part of the
original District Task Force subcommittee structures, either on a District or
local level, but other organizations have ceased or have never participated in
coordination efforts.
The underdeveloped infrastructure
in Trincomalee district resulting from the 20 years of conflict has proven both
a blessing and a curse. The lack of
development meant that, in comparison to the South and other areas, there was less
infrastructure to be damaged by the Tsunami.
However, the condition of the existing infrastructure is so bad that it
has been an impediment in relief and reconstruction activities, substantially
increasing transit times, creating difficulties in communication between
government officials, and the lack of economic diversification, with the
principal sectors being fishing and agriculture, has had serious long term
livelihood impact resulting from the tsunami.
The lack of skilled labor has also slowed the reconstruction process.
The government staff and
structure in Trincomalee has also had positive and negative experiences
responding to the disaster. The existing
government welfare and food distribution system has been able, with only minor
setbacks, to address the needs of the affected populations. Many government staff have experience with
internal displacement and disaster from the conflict period, and were able to
implement emergency procedures such as using government facilities for initial
IDP camps. Also there are dedicated
public servants in the government cadre who continue to spend long hours
working to respond to the disaster.
However, the tsunami also overwhelmed the
existing government staff and structures
in many ways, revealing serious lack of local government capacity in some
areas. A principal constraint has been
the continued centralization of the disaster response resulting in; slow decision making and the corresponding
slow reconstruction process; confusion over local authority, decision making
processes and legal powers (the Buffer Zone); lack of communication and clarity
from the centre; erosion of the already weak Local Government (Pradeshiya
Sabhas and Municipal Councils) by the Central Government; and political
influence and interference that does not represent the interests or concerns of
the district. Sadly, there have been a
few isolated cases of corruption among officials.
Also of concern has been the
ongoing violence between various groups in the East which has begun to spread
to Trincomalee district, creating an increasingly unstable situation for
reconstruction activities. There
continues to exist tension between the SLA and LTTE. This has been exacerbated by the lack of a
regular forum for coordination between the LTTE and government officials in
disaster relief and reconstruction.
There continues to exist strong
community identification along ethnic and political lines, polarized by
political elites for their own benefit.
There have been several Hartals (general strikes) called by the various
communities post-tsunami protesting unequal distribution of relief supplies and
other perceived irregularities in the relief and reconstruction process.
Another ongoing impediments have
been environmental conditions.
Unseasonable rain has severely affected families living in tents,
substandard transitional shelter and low lying lands. Continuing fear of another tsunami,
highlighted by the public response to the 29 March earthquake in Nias,
Indonesia, and uncertainty about the full extent of environmental impact and
degradation caused by the tsunami also hinder efforts at rebuilding affected
communities.
The high number of NGOs and other
actors and influx of resources will continue to pose a challenge to
reconstruction efforts, until a strong coordination and communication system is
in place and regularly used. But if
effectively coordinated and efficiently used, the resources presented by these
organizations can pave the way not only for short term relief and
rehabilitation, but for long term sustainable economic and infrastructure
development in Trincomalee that can raise living standards above the pre
tsunami level. A difference can really be made, particularly among vulnerable
groups.
Critical to long term
sustainability of initiatives undertaken in the rehabilitation and
reconstruction period are:
·
Strengthening Central and Local government systems
and capacity to better manage district reconstruction efforts
·
De-concentration of decision making power to better
respond to the needs of the affected communities
·
Increased transparency of central government
policies and effective communication of policies to actors
·
Avoiding a resumption of armed hostilities and
coordinating with the LTTE in unclear areas
·
Overcoming vested interests at the local, district,
regional and national levels to provide cooperation and dialogue among all
actors in the reconstruction process, especially in the political system
·
Strengthening of community participation
Strengths
·
District Task Force Committee (every one involved an
opportunity for dialogue)
·
Large no. of INGOs and NGOs, other concerned parties
·
Lots of resource.
·
The government staffs and structure.
·
Low no of deaths
·
Under developed infrastructure.
·
Concerned individuals donate time, resources (land and
money)
Weakness
·
District Task Force committee
·
Data collection, reporting and monitoring
·
Coordination
·
Centralization of process, slow decision making
process
·
Constrains on local officers from center
·
Lack of communication and clarity from center
·
Confusion over authority and legal powers (Buffer
zone)
·
Lack of capacity
in government
·
Weakness of local government
·
Competition among NGOs and other actors
·
Political influence/interference
·
The deteriorating security situation
·
Lack of joint mechanism
·
Spontaneous increasing NGOs (Especially with no
experience in North East)
·
Lack of infrastructure
·
Conflict situation
·
Hartal
·
Divided communities along ethnic/political lines
·
Slow decision making process resulting in slow
reconstruction
·
Environment – weather, fear of tsunami, etc.
·
Ulterior / Secondary motives of actors involved in
reconstruction (political, religious, cultural, economic, etc.)
·
Corruption
·
Lack of skilled labor
Opportunities
·
Increased number of NGOs/ actors
·
Increased resources
·
Support from Central and Local government
·
MOU / renewal of peace process / increased security
/ increased dialogue and cooperation /
Joint Mechanism
·
Cooperation and dialogue among different political
parties
·
Strengthening of community through participation and
support from individuals (land, time, resources, etc.)
·
Long term sustainable development – making it better
than before
-
Infrastructure improvement
-
Economic diversification
·
Improved living conditions / economic status of
community
·
Increased coordination among development actors
·
Targeting vulnerable communities
Threats
·
Political (interests/influence/interference)
·
Security / potential for renewal of conflict
·
Environment (fear of tsunami, unseasonal rain,
cyclones, flooding, etc.)
·
Continued centralization of reconstruction
·
Slow reconstruction process
·
Ulterior/secondary motives of actors involved in
reconstruction
·
Corruption
·
Changing government policies
·
Lack of clear leadership, coordination, directives,
policies, authority